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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STASi , i . U.M. I , ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: DILLON 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 220010384-CA 
DOUGLAS DOYLE DILLON, ) Argument Priority: (15) 
Defe ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Uia. 
appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first 
degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT of ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. I I he first issi appeal is whether or not th^ trial • i •• • 
in allowing the State to present evidence of Defendant/Appellant's prior bad acts 
over the objection of defense counsel and upon the basis of the same constituting 
nt of the offense o f « 
ISSUE NO. 2: The additional issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court 
erred in not allowing the Defendant/Appellant to wear street clothing of his choosing 
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which was not otherwise objectionable where he was allowed to wear street clothing 
chosen by law enforcement or whether or not the trial court erred in having the 
Appellant shackled in front of the jury and no instruction given. 
STANDARD of REVIEW 
Appellant believes the central issue involves Rules 402,403 and 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, 1953, as amended, as recently decided in State of Utah v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, (Utah 1999), post 1998 amendment, which if anything 
changed the standard of review from one of limited deference to the trial court's 
discretion to that of abuse of discretion adopting the Dibello line of cases, see State 
v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). In State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 
1989), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that while as a matter of law certain 
categories of evidence are presumptively unfairly prejudicial, the trial judge is the 
one primarily responsible for making the evaluation of whether the proponent of the 
evidence has overcome that presumption. 
The remaining issue is one sounding in due process requiring that an accused 
receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury, free from outside influences. State v. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1348 (Utah 1977), rehearing denied, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 LEd.2d 194 (1978); Irwin v. 
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639,1642,6 LEd.2d 751, 755 (1961). In the 
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context that the matter involves an issue of law, the Appellant believes that the 
standard is one of correctness. When faced with a question of statutory 
construction, the reviewing court first looks to the plain language of the statute. See 
State v. Larson. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). When the matter involves a 
factual issue, the standard of review would be "clearly erroneous". The procedural 
issues on motions to suppress or the introduction of evidence at trial, are generally 
mixed issues of law and fact. Where evidence of prior criminal acts is admitted to 
prove motive, or opportunity, intent or the like, the Court should give a cautionary 
instruction to the jury to use the evidence only for the specific purpose for which it 
is admitted, but failure to so instruct does not necessarily constitute prejudicial error. 
See State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory and regulatory provisions which Appellant believes applicable 
are as follows: 
Rules 402, 403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (1953, as amended). 
PRIOR JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
The prior judicial authority which Appellant believes applicable is from the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Decorso, 1999 Utah 57, (Utah 1999), and 
/// 
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it is Appellant's contention that the trial court in the instant case failed to follow the 
analysis of this prior judicial authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE of the CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, DOUGLAS 
DOYLE DILLON, convicted by jury trial on March 23, 2001, on the charges of 
burglary of a dwelling and receiving stolen property, each a third degree felony. 
Prior to the trial, the Appellant, shackled, requested to wear his street clothes which 
were in storage at the jail. A brief recess was taken and the Appellant was brought 
a dress shirt and tie. The Appellant continued to object stating that he wanted the 
opportunity to select his own clothing and in the course of doing so discussed his 
concern about being shackled in the court room. See trial transcript at pages 8 
through 10. At trial, the State attempted to introduce evidence Exhibits 13 and 14, 
a pawn slip and a swap meet receipt, and defense counsel objected on the grounds 
that the exhibits were not related to the pending charges, did not involve stolen 
property, but were being used by the State to show some furtherance of a plan or 
design unrelated and untied to the case. See trial transcript at pages 54 and 55. 
The Court sustained the defense counsel's objection. In the afternoon, upon the 
State's further attempt to introduce the exhibits the Court again sustained the 
objection of defense counsel. The State asserted that the exhibits were a necessary 
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element to the State's case on the charge of possession of stolen property. See trial 
transcript at pages 74-78. The trial court reversed its previously ruling and allowed 
the exhibits to be introduced. A jury instruction was given, instruction number 14a 
see the record at 00057, which states that knowledge or belief that property is 
stolen, required by the receiving stolen property instruction, is presumed in a case 
of an actor who is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion. The instruction goes on to say that this presumption does not 
relieve the State from proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. However, the instruction does not caution the jury to be careful not to convict 
the Appellant on the pending charges on the basis of prior acts from events 
unrelated to the offenses. In fact, the inference drawn from the instruction is that the 
jury can presume that the Appellant was guilty of a crime for the possession of 
stolen property if in possession or control of property stolen on a separate occasion. 
No other instruction was offered or given regarding such a caution. Based on the 
evidence received and the instructions given, the Appellant was found guilty of the 
crimes, burglary of a dwelling and receiving stolen property. The Appellant declined 
the preparation of a presentence report and was sentenced to serve zero (0) to five 
/// 
/// 
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(5) years, the charges to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to any 
other sentences not handed down by that Court. The Appellant was placed in the 
in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. On or about the 18th day of January, 2001, Thomas Braun, a local 
contractor discovered that his tools had been stolen the previous evening at a 
construction site. See trial transcript at page 35. 
2. At trial, the testimony of officer Kelly Edwards was proffered to the Court 
regarding his report that the Appellant had been stopped and questioned about 
property in his possession which appeared to be construction equipment, particularly 
a Honda generator. See trial transcript at pages 33 and 34. 
3. Through investigation, Detective Mark Gower discovered tools and 
equipment meeting the description of Mr. Braun in the possession of Appellant 
together with other tools and equipment believed to have been stolen from other 
construction sites in different areas of southern Utah, including Millard County. See 
trial transcript at pages 48 to 51. 
4. Sometime prior to trial in Iron County, the Appellant entered into pleas of 
guilty to two (2) counts of attempted receiving stolen property, each a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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5. At trial, Appellant requested from the Court the right to choose street 
clothing suitabi trial and discussed with the Court the nw»<1 to be shackled in the 
presence of the jury. The Court denied the Appellant the right to choose his own 
clothing but Appellant was provided with a dress shirt and tie and was required to be 
shackled in the presence of the jury. 
6. At trial, the State attempted to introduce Exhibits 13 and 14, Exhibit 13, a 
pawn shop receipt and Exhibit 14, a swap meet receipt. See the Exhibit list, at the 
record 00079. See also trial transcript at pages 54, 55, 73 through 78. While there 
property, and it was made clear that they did not involve property that was stolen in 
the in case involving the pending charges, it was never clarified as to whether or not 
the receipts in fact represented stolen property or pertained to othei pending 
offenses in another jurisdiction. Without clarification, the jury was instructed to 
presume that the Appellant had knowledge or belief that property was stolen if he 
was found in possession or in control of other property stolen on a separate 
occasion. See jury instruction at the record at page 00057. There was no cautionary 
instruction advising the jury not to find the Defendant guilty of the pending charges 
simply because he was presumed to have knowledge if he was in possession of 
property stolen on a separate occasion. 
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7. The Appellant was found guilty of the charges of burglary of a dwelling and 
receiving stolen property, each a third degree felony, and sentenced to serve zero 
(0) to five (5) years concurrently with each charge but consecutive to any other 
charges that Appellant may have, presumably the Millard County class A 
misdemeanor offenses. 
8. Notice of appeal was initially filed on or about the 16th day of April, 2001, 
and upon the Court of Appeals Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition, and 
upon the Stipulated Motion for Remand and Final Order, the matter was remanded 
to the trial court and Appellant's sentence was entered on the 5th day of June, 2001. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The trial court erred in allowing the admission of State's Exhibits 13 and 
14, a pawn slip and swap meet receipt, at trial where the Court failed to properly 
apply the analysis of State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, and Appellant asserts that 
proper consideration would have led to the exclusion of such evidence. First, the 
trial court did not consider the matter in light of the requirements of Rule 402, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Had it considered the evidence from the stand point of 
relevancy, it would have required that a proper foundation be laid to connect the 
exhibits to items of stolen property. Since this was not done, the jury was instructed 
to presume that the exhibits did represent items of stolen property from another 
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location. Moreover, the exhibits submitted would not be generally found relevant to 
establish knowledge of stolen property, rather evidence of previous convictions. In 
this case, the evidence of previous convictions was for misdemeanors and nol 
admissible. Second, the trial court failed to consider the evidence for prejudicial 
concern pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. In this case, while the 
the existence of any fact more or less probable, its prejudicial impact is substantial 
and significant in that it allowed the jury to presume the matter of Appellant's prior 
acts that inferred guilt in the context of establishing knowledge for a crime of 
receiving stolen property. The distinction in the purpose of the evidence was never 
adequately explained to the jury and it is unlikely that the jury figured it out on its 
own. Third, the instructions that were given regarding the prior acts problem were 
not only inadequate, they were misleading. After reading the instructions as given 
one of reasonable intelligence is led to believe that it was proper to presume that the 
Appellant was guilty of receiving stolen property simply by having possession of a 
pawn slip and swap meet receipt I hen: wdsnoi.Hutionarv instruction given and the 
trial court made no explanation to limit the scope and purpose of the evidence. Last, 
the Court allowed the evidence in as part of the State's case in chief. The evidence 
no matter how characterized is clearly character evidence if it is relevant at all and 
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not the elementary evidence that the State attempted to argue. It should not have 
been allowed to be introduced as part of the case in chief. 
B. The trial court erred in not allowing the Appellant to wear street clothing of 
his choosing and requiring him to be shackled in front of the jury without some 
specific concern for security. There is a due process consideration to not unduly 
interfere with an accused's right to defend and such measures of control 
unnecessarily exercised can and do have an impact upon a standard defense. The 
security concern should not be imposed routinely or as a matter of administrative 
policy of the correctional facility. Such measures should only be imposed when the 
specific circumstances of the case considered by the trial court warrant them. Such 
circumstances did not exist in this case. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION OF STATE'S 
EXHIBITS 13 AND 14 AT TRIAL. 
The central issue of Appellant's appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals is 
whether or not the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 13 and 14 and if it was error 
whether the same constituted reversible error. The Appellant believes that the 
matter was not analyzed in the context of State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, and as a 
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result was admitted without proper and due consideration given to Rules 402 and 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The Appellant further contends that the pawn slip and 
swap meet receipts did not involve stolen property. However, the jury was allowed 
to make that inference and in fact presume that the possession of such receipts 
raised a presumption that Appellant had knowledge that he was in possession of 
stolen property. The Appellant believes that appropriate analysis and consideration 
under the direction of the Rule and as explained in Decorso would have led to the 
exclusion of the evidence as being not relevant and/or substantially more prejudicial 
than probative and further confusing the issues or misleading the jury into making 
presumptions about the evidence diminishing the State's burden of proof. Rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads as follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not inadmissable to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intend, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. (Emphasis 
added). 
The last sentence was added by amendment in 1998, and makes 
clear that the admissibility of such evidence requires more than a showing that the 
evidence is for a non character purpose and must meet the requirements of Rules 
of 402 and 403. The State initially attempted to introduce the evidence anticipating 
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that Detective Gower would testify as to modis operendi or plan, showing a common 
or scheme. See trial transcript at page 55. The State then attempted to introduce 
the exhibits as an exception to the hearsay rule involving public records and reports 
or judgment of previous convictions. However, the evidence was not in the form of 
a judgment of a previous conviction and the previous conviction was for the charge 
of attempted possession of stolen property in Millard County involving 
misdemeanors which did not involve a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess 
of one (1) year. The Court again denied admissibility. See trial transcript at pages 
33 and 34. 
On the third attempt, the State attempted to introduce the exhibits as essential 
elements to the crime of possession of stolen property. The charge of receiving 
stolen property, as applied in the instant case, not only diminishes the importance 
of the rule excluding prior bad acts for character purposes but allows for the use of 
a presumption of knowledge in establishing the offense and thereby deluding the 
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The confusion was present in 
the instant case in part because the pawn slip and swap meet receipt were not for 
items of property determined to have been stolen on a prior occasion. In short, the 
jury was allowed to infer that by the introduction of Exhibits 13 and 14 that in fact 
they did represent items of stolen property from another occasion which allowed the 
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jury to presume that the Defendant had knowledge that the items were stolen in his 
possession in the instant case. The Appellant asserts that this procedure was in 
error for the following reasons. 
POINT NO. I 
The Trial Court Did Not Consider The Matter In Light Of The Requirements 
Of Rule 402, Utah Rules Of Evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, sets forth the requirements for admissibility 
of relevant evidence and simply states that all relevant evidence is admissible. If 
evidence is not relevant it is not admissible. Relevant evidence is defined by Rule 
having a tenancy to make the existence of any fact that is a consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence. In light of that definition, it is evident that the introduction of the pawn 
slips was not relevant to the trial at hand. The inference drawn from the pawn slips, 
that they represented slips or receipts for items of stolen property on another 
occasion might have been relevant if the foundation had been laid properly. 
However, no such foundation was made and the pawn slip and swap meet receipt 
were introduced under that inference when in fact they did not represent evidence 
or prior stolen property. Consequently, the evidence that was introduced at trial was 
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crime of receiving stolen property. The Appellant was not found in possession or 
control of other property stolen on a separate occasion. He was found in possession 
of a pawn slip and a swap meet receipt which was believed to be for property stolen 
on a separate occasion but which no foundation was laid to determine as much. 
Even the evidence as submitted by the State under the argument that it was 
essential to establish their case for receiving stolen property did not meet the 
requirements of the statute. Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints" of prior 
incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of Defendant's 
truthfulness or veracity. Admissions of such evidence without further explanation 
could only have caused the jury to speculate about the Defendant's propensities to 
commit such crimes and confuse the issues, all to the prejudice of the Defendant, 
which necessitates a new trial. See State v. Goodliffe. 578 P.2d 1288,1290 (Utah 
1978). 
POINT NO. II 
The Evidence Should Have Been Excluded As Substantially More Prejudicial 
Than Probative, Under Rule 403. 
The application of Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is often confusing and 
misleading in terms of its application. However, in this case, there can be no 
question about the unfair prejudicial tendency that the evidence would have in 
influencing the trial improperly to draw the presumption that the Appellant has the 
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requisite knowledge under the crime of receiving stolen property. Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by 
improper means, if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on 
something other than the facts of the case. See Terry v. Zion's Cooperative 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland 
v. Skagqs Company Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Bartley, 784 
P.2d 1231 (Ut App 1989). In the instance case, the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion in allowing the evidence to be admitted. However, it is Appellant's belief 
that because the Court had sustained defense counsel's opposition to the evidence 
on at least two (2) prior occasions, that the evidence when finally admitted was given 
a heightened sense of importance that only further confused the jury in 
understanding its significance for assessing weight. That is, it put the Appellant in 
an even worse light than if the evidence had been admitted from the start. Thus, 
although the trial court did not enter into this type of analysis, its prejudicial impact 
was intensified due to the process in which it was introduced and its probative 
importance was never clearly established. Consequently, the impact upon the jury 
was substantial. 
/// 
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POINT NO. Ill 
The Jury Instruction Given At The Time Of Trial Was Inadequate And Misleading. 
A standard jury instruction for the crime of receiving stolen property was given 
in instruction number 14. However, instruction number 14a, the record at page 
00057, states that knowledge or belief that the property is stolen required by the 
receiving stolen property instruction, is presumed in the case of an actor who is 
found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion. No 
part of the instruction attempts to caution the jury to not find the Appellant guilty of 
this offense upon a belief that he was guilty of offenses in another case. In situations 
where relevant evidence may be admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for 
another, such as the situation at hand, the trial judge upon request shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. See State v. Smith, 
700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). Therefore, it is error not to give a limiting 
instruction. In the instant case it is clear that the outcome of the trial was affected 
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POINT NO. IV 
The Court Erred In Allowing The State To Introduce The Evidence As Part Of Its 
Case and Chief. 
A predecessor to the present Rule 404(b) was Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971) which provided that evidence... that a person committed a crime is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime ... but, ... such evidence is 
admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact... motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity." See State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d 
164,167, footnote 12 (Utah 1978). Pursuant to that Rule and in conjunction with the 
permitted to proceed in its case in chief to introduce evidence of past offenses of 
misconduct of a Defendant. Id. 164 (Utah 1978). While the statutory language has 
changed, the underlying fundamental principle is no different and in fact continues 
to be an assumption made by most trial court's that evidence of prior bad acts of 
misconduct is not permitted in the case in chief of the State. As in the above case, 
where one cannot say with assurance that the result would have been the same if 
the mandate of the statute had been complied with, the reviewing Court is not 
justified in concluding that the error was not prejudicial to the Defendant. As a result, 
it is necessary that the judgment be reversed and the case be remanded for a new 
trial. See also State v. Seabert, 6 Utah ;>d 198 310 P I'd 388 (1957) 
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a 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WEAR 
STREET CLOTHES OF HIS CHOOSING AND HAVING THE DEFENDANT 
SHACKLED IN FRONT OF THE JURY. 
The remaining issue of Appellant is one that is not well defined within the 
precedent of the State of Utah. In fact, the attorney for Appellant is unable to find a 
single case addressing the issue from the standpoint of a right to wear clothing of 
one's choosing at the time of trial. There is, however, imbedded within the notion of 
a fair and speedy trial, a due process provision requiring that an accused receive a 
trial before a fair and impartial jury, free from outside influences. See State v. Pierre, 
572 P.2d 1338,1348 (Utan 1977), rehearing denied, 576 P.2d 757 (Utah 1978), cert, 
denied, 439 U.S. 882,99 S.Ct. 219 58 LEd.2d 194 (1978). In State v. Gardner, the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed the principle from a stand point of security. In that 
case, four (4) unarmed plain clothed guards were present at trial. Two (2) sat behind 
the Defendant and two (2) stationed themselves elsewhere in the courtroom. The 
Defendant was accused of being involved in an attemptto escape while incarcerated 
but appearing on a hearing at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City, 
attorney Michael Burdell was killed and others were wounded. In addressing the 
security measure in that case, the Court distinguished the case of People v. Duran, 
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a California Supreme Court Case, which sets forth the basic common law rule 
established for the State of California in People v. Harrington. 42 Cal. 165 (1871), 
stating: 
[A] 
"any order or action of the Court which, without evidence necessity, 
imposes physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during 
the progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his 
mental faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially 
affect his constitutional rights of defense; and especially would such 
physical bonds and restraints in like matter materially impair and 
prejudicially affect his statutory privilege of becoming a competent 
witness and testify in his own behalf." See Duran at 545 P.2d 1326 
(Cal 1976). 
In the instant case, the inquiry taken place before the Court regarding the 
wearing of street apparel lead in part to an explanation as to why he would be 
shackled in the courtroom before the jury. See trial transcript at pages 6 thought 9. 
The Appellant was concerned about the impact that his appearance would have in 
front of a jury and this also included him being restrained. However, counsel did not 
object specifically to the restraint and therefore it may have been waived. The 
Appellant asserts that the issue is not one simply of what restraint is required at trial 
but goes to the issue of allowing the accused to properly prepare for his defense. 
Interference with such preparation for an unspecified reason of security, such as 
policies and procedures of a jail or other facility, have an impact upon the 
Page 19 of 23 
Defendant's ability to prepare for his defense and be in the frame of mind necessary 
to testify, confront witnesses, appear before the Court and appear before a jury and 
further participate in his defense. Where there is not specific direction given by the 
Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it seems to be at the discretion of the 
trial court to justify the shackling of those in the custody of a correctional facility and 
to simply provide them with clothes from a prison guard that is less obvious but 
clearly says to a juror these are not my clothes. The impact this has upon a jury is 
to call into question the credibility of that witness from his appearance that may not 
have anything to do with the charges at hand but a Defendant would be forced to 
deal with simply because of a general security policy that is imposed. In the instant 
case, there is no way of knowing what impact the fact that Defendant was required 
to wear street clothing picked out by the jail facility or was shackled during the time 
of trial may have had. While the issue is one that does not appear to have been 
directly considered by the Utah Courts, the position seems to be well established in 
other jurisdictions that such interference, without evident necessity, materially 
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CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, DOUGLAS 
DOYLE DILLON, prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's ruling and 
for other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 













J. BRYAN JACKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant Dillon 
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ADDENDUM A 
COPIES OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE 
RECORD 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14a 
The knowledge or belief that the property is stolen, required by the 
Receiving Stolen Propertyjnstructioi) is presumed in the case of an actor who is 
found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion. 
This presumption does not relieve the State from proving every element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In speaking of the receiving or having 
possession of other stolen property the fair interpretation includes "knowing it to 
have been stolen." Knowing that the property is stolen is what law condemns; 
and it should not be deemed to include any innocent or unaware possession of 
stolen property. 
While the presumed fact that the defendant was possessing stolen property 
must be proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the 
facts giving rise to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 
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15 State cranberry/white striped shirt, & ti Y Y 
ADDENDUM B 
COPY OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF 
TRANSCRIPTS FROM APPELLANT'S JURY TRIAL 
THE COURT: What — can I see the clothes? 
MR. DO^EY: And, Your Honor, Detective Gower could 
testify about what was in his truck as far as clothing. 
THE COURT: Okay. I am being given a plastic sack 
with a sweat shirt that says ESPN Sports Center, and a pair of 
jeans, regular blue jeans. What were in your effects, what 
clothes were in your effects, other than these that you wanted 
to wear? 
THE DEFENDANT: I had some shirts with pullover 
sleeveless sweaters. 
THE COURT: What kind of shirt? 
THE DEFENDANT: A dress shirt, brown shirt. 
THE COURT: It's brown in color? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I had two or three of them. I 
had a whole duffel bag full of clothes. 
THE COURT: Have we got that here or somewhere? 
MR. SESSIONS: I think that his property is still 
probably in his truck, except I do believe that the boots or 
shoes are being retained by the sheriff's department as 
evidence in another case. They are not inclined to release 
them. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SESSIONS: Perhaps Mr. Dillon needs to know that 
he111 be'seated over-here during the entire proceeding. The 
jury won't know what's on your feet. 
6 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. SESSIONS: You'll always be seated. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I have to testify. 
MR. SESSIONS: Right. But they will put you on the 
stand. 
THE COURT: We'll take them out. We'll take the jury 
out, bring you from there up to here, then bring the jury back. 
So they will never see your feet. I'm most concerned and --
really, even the Levis they are not going to see. But the 
sweat shirt --
MR. SESSIONS: Looks a little — 
THE COURT: Yeah, it seems like — 
THE DEFENDANT: My whole suitcase came with me into 
the jail facility and sat in there for three days. They took 
my jewelry, all my clothes, my boots, out of the facility 
somewhere. So they can't -- for them to say that my stuff, 
they don't know what's in my truck, they are not... 
THE COURT: If you've got a dress shirt, that would 
look better than a sweat shirt. Is there a dress shirt that is 
not --
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, Defective Gower, the only 
thing he saw in the truck and, correct me if I'm wrong, there 
is some wife beater shirts that are buttoned down. He's got 
the arms to — 
THE COURT: Okay. By wife beater, you mean a 
7 
sleeveless T-shirt? 
MR. DOXEY: Yes. Ifm sorry, Your Honor. , And don't 
mean to interrupt — 
JAIL PERSONNEL: We did try tp give him one of our 
facility shirts that has the striped collar — 
THE COURT: Dress shirt? 
JAIL PERSONNEL: — with a red tie that matches the 
stripes in it we use for the inmates to take pictures to send 
home. And he didn't want to do that either. 
THE COURT: Is it of a size that fits him? He's a 
pretty big guy. 
JAIL PERSONNEL: I don't know. (Inaudible.) It's a 
double "X". 
THE COURT: It's a double "X." It might. 
THE DEFENDANT: I was going back to the fact that they 
have a whole suitcase of my clothes that for some reason they 
don't want to say they have them. 
THE COURT: I have a jury sitting out here, so I need 
to move this as fast as possible. If we could get you a dress 
shirt that fits and a tie, I realize that you don't have any 
sentimental value there, but if you look good in that sitting 
at that table, then I think we have accomplished what we need 
to do. Do you know where, Mr. Gower, where a brown shirt is? 
DETECTIVE GOWER: Well, I looked at his property. 


























go back and look again if need be. 
THE DEFENDANT: Did you see a blue duffel bag? 
DETECTIVE GOWER: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: With my cell phone and all 'my stuff in 
it? 
DETECTIVE GOWER: Blue duffel bag, sir. But I can go 
back and look again if you like. 
THE DEFENDANT: That was in my property in the jail. 
I don't know how it got back in my truck. 
DETECTIVE GOWER: We had a search warrant for your 
belongings. I've gone through your belongings. I took it back 
to your truck. 
THE COURT: Let's move it along. Let's bring — let's 
do both. Let's see if you can find a dress shirt, his dress 
shirt, brown one. Are there any other different colored dress 
shirts? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. There is a dress shirt in there, 
then a nice dress sweater, pullover. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's see if you can find a dress 
shirt and a pullover sweater. In the meantime, just in case we 
can't, let's bring a shirt and tie, double "X", and see if that 
fits. 
Then, let's tell the jury -- I don't know what — that 
we have some legal matters that we are undertaking, that we 
haven't forgotten them. Okay. 
1 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 
2 THE COURT: Back on the record in the Dillon case. 
3 And we have — we had, as I understand it, three sets of 
4 clothes, basically. The first set, the second set o*f private 
5 clothes, and the third set was from the jail. And of those 
6 three, he selected the first set to our clothes; is that 
7 I correct? 
8 MR. SESSIONS: He has. But just to make the record, 
9 Your Honor, he does object. He wanted an opportunity to select 
10 his own clothing and doesn't believe that it was meanfully 
11 presented to him. He didn't have an opportunity to do that. I 
12 was in the corridor when the clothes were brought that 
13 Detective Gower found from his vehicle. And the shirt and tie 
14 was ultimately provided from the facility. So I did see that 
15 interchange. 
16 THE COURT: All right. And the shirt from the 
17 facility -- why don't you hold it up there at the podium. 
18 MR. DOXEY: (Inaudible) mark it into evidence if we 
19 are going to have an issue here. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 MR. DOXEY: And I brought my other exhibits marked, 
22 Your Honor, so if I could maybe mark this particular item 
23 Exhibit No. 15. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Dress shirt and tie? 
25 MR. DOXEY: Dress shirt and tie. 
1 It is the state's position -- I believe you will find 
2 beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dillon, after Mr. Braun 
3 left, went out to the job site, broke into the trailer and kept 
4 all the property. Itfs a pretty simple fact scenario. All 
5 these events took place in Iron County. Okay. 
6 When Detective Gower and Detective -- or, rather, 
7 Police Officer Edwards saw the truck, it was sitting at the 
8 Value Inn here in Cedar City. And that's where it was 
9 confiscated, taken to the sheriff's department. And a search 
10 warrant was obtained. And then they took all of the property 
11 out and found it to be Mr. Braun's. Okay. Pretty simple. 
12 Simple fact scenario. 
13 And I want you to listen to the evidence closely. 
14 Listen to both the prosecution and the defense. Okay. But I'm 
15 convinced that when you listen to the evidence you conclude 
16 that Mr. Dillon knew exactly what he was doing. That he went 
17 out there with the intent to burglarize that trailer. And he 
IS stole the property and then kept it, retained it. And that's 
L9 what I believe the evidence will be. Thank you. 
!0 THE COURT: Mr. Sessions? 
!1 MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I would like to reserve my 
2 opening statement until the presentation of my evidence. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear the first witness then. 
4 MR. DOXEY: Yes, Your Honor. We have, I believe, a 
5 stipulated proffer. If called to testify, Officer Kelly 
Edwards would testify that he made contact with Mr. Dillon 
about 3 o'clock in the morning on the 18th of January 2001. 
Officer Edwards would further testify that he was able to look 
in the back of the defendant's truck and saw a Honda generator, 
and that he ultimately made a report of his findings and filed 
it with the Cedar City Police Department. 
MR. SESSIONS: Accepted. 
THE COURT: Okay. What that means is, that both sides 
agree that if he took the stand, that is what Mr. Edwards would 
say. 
Go ahead and call your next witness. 
MR. DOXEY: Yes, Your Honor. The state calls Mr. Tom 
Braun. 
THOMAS BRAUN, 
called by PLAINTIFF, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DOXEY: 
Q Mr. Braun, will you state your name for the record. 
A Thomas Braun. 
Q And how are you employed? 
A Self-employed, Braun-Rich Construction. 
Q Okay. You build houses? 
A Yes. 
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may seem a little bit odd, you'll get the question then 
them. 
Do you recall the date of January 17th, 2001? 
I do. 
Okay. Where were you -- were you working on that date? 
Yes. 
Do you recall about what time you finished working? 
About 5 o'clock. 
Okay. 
Normally. J 
5 o'clock in the afternoon? J 
Correct. 
Where were you working at the time? 
Cross Hollow Hills. 
Is that within Iron County? 
Yes. 
Okay. Just south of Cedar City, right? 1 
Yes. 
Okay. And what were you doing there? J 
Framing a house. 
Framing a house? Okay. And as part of your job on 
that date, did you use your tools? 
1 Q Okay. And do you recall the date of January 18th, 
2 I 2001? 
A I do. 
4 I Q Do you recall seeing Mr. Braun on that date? 
5 A I do. 
6 Q What was the nature of your first contact with Mr. 
7 I Braun? 
A He come to the front window of our office to hand -- to 
9 I turn in a list of items stolen from his job trailer. 
10 Q Okay. At that point, what did you do when you first 
11 learned of it? What did you first do? 
12 I A With Mr. Braun? 
Q With Mr. Braun. 
A I was just stepping out the door to do some information 
I had received. I first got word of this, that Mr. Braun's 
theft and burglary, from another deputy. I had already made a 
few phone calls and was en route to go to where Mr. Dillon's 
vehicle was to see what I could see. And Mr. Braun come in 
just as I was leaving. And I asked him to come with me. 
Q Okay. Thank you. Did you both travel to the location 
of the truck? 
A Yes. 
Q Where was it? 
A It was the Value Inn, I believe at 344 South Main 
Street here in Cedar City. 
Q Okay. And were you able to look inside the back of the 
truck? 
A Yes. 
Q Did Mr. Braun identify the property as his? 
A Immediately. 
Q Did Mr. Braun1s property that he identified match with 
the list that he had provided you? 
A There were some items on there that he hadn't wrote 
down. But --
Q Some items in the truck that he hadn't written down? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. Generally, did they coincide? 
A Yes. 
Q And based on what you had seen and Mr. Braun1s 
representations, did you obtain a search warrant? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. And was the truck ultimately towed to the Iron 
County Sheriff's Office? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you execute the warrant? 
A I did. 
Q How did you gain access to the back of his truck? 
A* The search warrant encompassed both items within the 
truck and, also, property, personal belongings that were booked 
into jail with Mr. Dillon. I went to booking at the Iron 
County Jail, obtained keys to the vehicle, went out, and the 
vehicle was locked; the camper shell, specifically; found a key 
on the key ring that matched the camper shell and opened it. 
Q So his key that was in his pocket matched the back of 
the camper shell? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And the truck was fully secured until that time? 
A Yes. I remained with it until it was towed to our 
parking lot. 
Q Okay. And the doors were locked and the back was 
locked? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Did you then get all the property out, all the 
items within the truck out of the truck? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And I show you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibits No., actually start with 2 through 5. Do you 
recognize — just take a look at those. Do you recognize those 
pictures? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Okay. Did you take those pictures? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. And do they accurately depict what was within 
Mr. Dillonfs truck? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you know it was Mr. Dillon's truck? 
A The registration, when run through our computers, come 
back in his name. 
Q And among the items that you found in the truck, did 
you find a crowbar? 
A Yes. 
Q I show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit No. 1. 
Is that the crowbar that you found within his trunk? 
A Yes. Appears to be. 
Q Did you notice anything distinctive about that 
particular crowbar? 
A Distinctive, it had one ear up here bent as if it had 
pried something. 
Q Are there any markings on it? 
A There is some white paint transfer onto it. 
Q Okay. And where is the white paint transfer? 
A It would be here. The majority of it here. Some here, 
And some about right here. 
Q Okay. All right. And I understand the paint may have 
faded a bit. I show you what's been marked as, let's go to 
State's Exhibit — out of order a little bit — 8 and 9. Do 
you recognize those photos? 
A Yes. 
Q Who took them? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. Among those documents, did you find State's 
Exhibit No. 13? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you also see State's Exhibit 14'? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Where were those documents? 
A They were located within the cab of the vehicle. 
Q Okay. Did you find them? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And what is — 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, I would like to approach. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, a sidebar conference 
was held off the record.) 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in 
open court outside the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, at this time I would like 
to make an objection to the exhibits and what I think the 
anticipated testimony is concerning those exhibits. 
THE COURT: These are 13 and 14? 
MR. SESSIONS: These are 13 and 14. My understanding 
is that these exhibits are not related to the theft, are not 
tied to the theft or the equipment thatfs been recovered, but 
are attempted to be used by the state to show some kind of 
furtherance of a plan or design that's unrelated and untied to 
this case. So my objection goes to relevance. Itfs also 
highly prejudicial to the jury. I thirik if a jury sees what 
these two items of evidence are, that they may jump to a 
conclusion that is unfair in light of the elements of this case 
and the requirements of this matter. 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, what they are, first is a pawn 
slip. It's a pawn slip for power tools. That I believe the 
pawn slip is out of Mesquite, Nevada; isn't that correct? 
THE WITNESS: This one's out of Jackson, Wyoming. 
MR. DOXEY: Out of Jackson. Okay. And the second is 
a receipt, that is a, what you call it, a swap meet receipt. 
Okay. I anticipate Detective Gower will testify that when 
people possess stolen property, it's (inaudible) by swap meets 
and pawn shops. 
THE COURT: Wouldn't this be evidence of prior bad act 
then? 
MR. DOXEY: It is, Your Honor. But I think it — 
if — 
THE COURT: How is that permissible? 
MR. DOXEY: I think what it does, is it shows a common 
scheme or plan, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SESSIONS: I think the testimony that's already 
introduced by the state from the victim is that he's recovered 
there's been any intentional hiding of anything. But they 
havenft been able to prepare to defend against this portion. 
MR. DOXEY: But, Your Honor, Detective Gower could 
testify that he was in possession of other property that was 
stolen that was within the confines of discovery. 
THE COURT: What part of the nine questions? 
MR. DOXEY: Just that Detective Gower would testify 
surrounding the facts contained in the police report, Your 
Honor. Itfs all in the police report. The defendant was 
convicted, Your Honor, on March 1st up there in Fillmore. But 
every bit of this information about the other stolen property, 
Your Honor, is in the police report as is the fact that --
MR. SESSIONS: Well, I don't mean to interrupt you. 
But I would simply argue that while it may be in a police 
report, it's certainly not factually determined in the police 
report. 
THE COURT: Let me take a look at the police report. 
We've got the police report. It's at the end? 
MR. DOXEY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Let me find it. 
it starts with... and Your Honor, I would also note that we are 
attempting to bring an officer from Washington County on the 
same basis to testify more construction site burglaries down in 
Washington County also contained in this police report. In 
fact, I have somebody on his way now. I think I found it. I 
just want to make sure I'm pointing out all of it because it's 
in two or three places. Your Honor, I kind of starred the 
general area With my pencil. I think there are three stars. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the second star, it says, 
"Search warrant executed at about 1615 hours on 1/18/01, 
Detective Edwards, Millard County deputy, Sergeant Cory" --
excuse me, "Scott Cory, Bill Jackson, and I served a search 
warrant at that time. All contents in Dillon's vehicle that 
were suspected to be evidence removed from the vehicle and 
photographed. Each item was logged down with its serial number 
if the item had one. Sergeant Scott Cory was able to identify 
some items in the Dillon vehicle that were stolen from a 
construction site in Millard County on or about 1/14/01. These 
items are a Monson Engineering tripod, serial number 63618, 
item two; construction elevation rod, item three; a Bosch 
jigsaw, serial number 5099, item 24. Above listed items, along 
with a set of bolt cutters, item 36, were released to Sergeant 
Cory on 1/18/01 at about 1800 hours." 
So that's what -- your allegation is that that was 
found within the truck? 
MR. DOXEY: Um-hmm. 
THE COURT: And — 
MR. DOXEY: Detective Gower can testify that the 
property was found within the truck, and that he went up and 
saw the defendant convicted of the crime and be sentenced. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is a new area for me. And it 
seems to go against what Ifm used to ruling as far as evidence 
of prior bad atfts. But it also does appear to be an element of 
subsection (2) that is permitted under the statute. I guess 
I've reversed myself a couple of times, so before I make a 
final ruling I'll let the defense respond. It appears that 
this does conform with that subsection. 
MR. SESSIONS: And it may very well, Your Honor. But 
I think that what the court has to be really careful with is, 
that even if we were to admit that evidence or you were to 
accept that, that I don't think that the state should be able 
to put on any additional evidence about it and that, instead, 
the court should simply have a jury instruction which we 
fashion which would include the knowledge or belief or 
requirement which the state's relying on in paragraph (b). 
THE COURT: Two (b)? 
MR. SESSIONS: Two (b), yes. Isn't that what your 
argument is, David? 
MR. DOXEY: Two. 
MR. SESSIONS: Oh, my mistake. Found in possession or 
control from a separate occasion. 
THE COURT: Why wouldn't he be allowed to put on 
evidence today? 
MR. SESSIONS: Well, I think it's inflammatory to the 
jury. If you are going to put on evidence of a misdemeanor 






























slamming this defendant. I think there's a 
kes place between saying that the knowledge 




is far different than allowing evidence that speaks about the 

















this case. That!s where the prejudice occurs. 
DOXEY: But we are not talking about Rule 403 or 
are not talking about 803 about prior convictions. 
talking about is an element of crime. 
SESSIONS: (Inaudible.) 
DOXEY: And we don't even get to 403. We 
402. 
COURT: We also need evidence for the jury 
to tie to; otherwise, it's just hanging out 
to connect to the case. 
DOXEY: I agree. 
COURT: So it appears to me that the state 
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1 either took it or received it. I mean, it's — I don't 
2 think — that definition of receiving stolen property, all you 
3 have to do is retain it. You don't even have to — you could 
4 convict on receiving stolen property if he's the one that 
5 actually took it, too. 
6 THE COURT: Do you want to add something else? 
7 MR. SESSIONS: Yes. I guess what troubles me about 
8 trying to qualify this as a (b) exception is that he wasn't 
9 convicted of receiving stolen property. To introduce evidence 
10 of that conviction, then I tliink that the jury ought to know 
11 what he's been convicted of. And if he is convicted of an 
12 attempted crime, then they need to have a legal explanation 
13 about what attempted means, because that's the nature of the 
14 offense. If the state argues that he -- that it's an (a) 
15 exception, and that he's found in possession or control of the 
16 property on a separate occasion, all this statute does is 
17 satisfy one element of the offense. That's all it does. It 
18 does not open the door wide to receive any evidence 
19 particularly about it. The statute doesn't say anything about 
20 evidence. It just simply cures that one element. 
21 MR. DOXEY: I don't know how I'm supposed ^ o even get 
22 to this unless I put on evidence that he was found in 
23 possession. I mean, I think that it necessarily has to be 
24 evidentiary the way it comes in. We can't just say, oh, by the 
25 way, here's a jury instruction without any facts to support it. 
1 THE COURT: Okay. We need to move forward. And I 
2 1 need to make a ruling. And we'll make a record of it. EitheL 
3 side can argue it. If there is an appeal, the Court of Appeals 
4 can correct me if Ifm wrong. But Ifm going to, based on the 
5 continued discussion that we have had, I'll allow you to 
6 present evidence in regards to both (a) and (b) since they are 
7 elements of the case. 
8 MR. DOXEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Let's bring the jury back in. He's 
10 already under oath and on the stand. So you can retake the 
11 stand, Deputy Gower. He can go back up. 
U MR. DOXEY: Yes, he needs to go back up on the stand. 
13 THE COURT: But not — let's have counsel approach. 
14 (Whereupon, a sidebar conference 
15 was held off the record.) 
16 THE COURT: Oh, this is Mr. Sessions'. 
17 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were held 
18 in open court in the presence of the jury.) 
19 BY MR. DOXEY: 
20 Q Detective Gower, where do you live? 
21 A In Meadow's Ranch Subdivision in Cedar City. 
22 Q Okay. Is that out beyond the Cross Hollow Subdivision 
23 if yoti are traveling west? 
24 A It's just across the road. 
25 Q Very close to it? 
